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INNOCENCE FOUND: 
RETRIBUTION, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AND 
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
Judith M. Barger* 
Although a majority of the United States Supreme Court theoretically 
accepts that the state-sanctioned killing of a factually innocent person 
is unconstitutional, it has been reluctant to announce a workable 
standard for individuals raising postconviction freestanding claims of 
actual innocence in capital cases. This Article explores how such 
claims should be addressed. It begins by examining the distinctions the 
Court has drawn between freestanding claims of innocence and those 
asserted in connection with other constitutional violations. Although the 
Court theoretically recognized the former in Herrera v. Collins, it has 
failed to articulate a clear standard to govern these claims, and it left 
great confusion regarding the available remedy. This Article argues 
that the development of these standards and remedies must be guided 
by the retributive principles that serve as the basis of the Court’s 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. With these principles in mind, this 
Article then proposes a tiered system of review for freestanding 
innocence claims that employs different standards depending on the 
remedy the petitioner seeks. This tiered system of standards and 
remedies would accord appropriate deference to the States’ interests in 
finality and preservation of prosecutorial and judicial resources, confer 
appropriate weight to the substantial liberty interests of the petitioner 
subject to execution, and give valid effect to the requirements of the 
Eighth Amendment as it applies to capital cases. 
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“Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject 
it merely because it comes late.”
1
 
 
For the last nineteen years,
2
 the Supreme Court has wrestled 
with the issue of whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the 
execution or imprisonment of a factually innocent
3
 person 
(hereinafter referred to as “innocent person”). In the developing 
jurisprudence on the issue, a majority of the Court agrees that state-
sanctioned killing of an innocent person would violate the Eighth 
Amendment but has struggled to develop a workable standard to 
apply when an individual raises the issue in light of evidence that is 
discovered postconviction. In fact, although the Court has implicitly 
recognized that an individual may make a postconviction 
freestanding claim of actual innocence in capital cases, the vague and 
onerous “standard” it applies has proven virtually impossible to 
meet.
4
 
The Court’s reluctance to announce a workable standard seems 
to derive from two interrelated sources of concern: (1) interference 
with the States’ interest in finality in criminal cases; and (2) the 
burden of having to retry cases with “stale” evidence.
5
 However, 
neither of these concerns is significant enough to overcome the 
Supreme Court’s own Eighth Amendment capital jurisprudence, 
which focuses more acutely on the actual guilt of an individual as a 
condition of execution. 
In the handful of innocence cases considered by the Supreme 
Court since its ruling in Herrera v. Collins,
6
 the Court has refused to 
announce any specific standard, stating only that such claims require 
 
 1. Henslee v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 2. The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutional propriety of executing an innocent 
person in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
 3. “Factually” or “actually” innocent are terms that refer to an individual who did not 
commit the crime for which he or she was convicted and sentenced to death. This definition 
should be distinguished from one that includes individuals who committed the charged crime but 
should not have been convicted due to a constitutional or other procedural error occurring at their 
trial. 
 4. The Supreme Court has yet to identify a set of facts that would satisfy this standard. 
 5. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417. 
 6. 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
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an “extraordinarily high”
7
 burden and a “truly persuasive 
demonstration”
8
 of innocence. However, when the death penalty is at 
issue, the Eighth Amendment requires a greater level of reliability to 
sustain an execution. This Article discusses how claims of innocence 
should be addressed within the context of capital punishment.
9
 The 
Supreme Court’s capital jurisprudence, which relies heavily on 
retributive theory, supports the application of a lesser standard when 
considering the issue of execution, as opposed to conviction. This 
discussion is divided into three parts: (1) the process of 
postconviction claims of innocence; (2) retributive themes in the 
Supreme Court’s capital jurisprudence; and (3) considerations of 
innocence in the context of pending executions. 
Part I of this Article explains how innocence claims are analyzed 
in the postconviction setting, while Part II discusses the Supreme 
Court’s reliance on retributive theories in its capital jurisprudence. 
Finally, Part III of this Article proposes a standard to address 
postconviction claims of innocence that is consistent with the Eighth 
Amendment’s retributive-based requirements in capital cases. 
I.  POSTCONVICTION 
CLAIMS OF INNOCENCE 
Once an individual has been convicted by a judge or jury, and 
all direct appeals have been exhausted, there are two methods for 
raising a claim of actual innocence in federal court. The first, and 
most commonly used, method is to use a claim of innocence as a 
“gateway” to argue other constitutional issues that have been 
procedurally defaulted.
10
 If the reviewing court finds that “it is more 
likely than not that no reasonable juror” would have found the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in light of new evidence 
of innocence, the defendant will be permitted access to a habeas 
forum to argue substantive constitutional issues, despite any 
 
 7. Id. at 417. 
 8. Id. at 427 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 9. This article does not defend the unworkable and yet to be defined “standard” announced 
by the Supreme Court in Herrera, which undoubtedly requires significant adjustment to 
legitimately enforce the Court’s holding. Instead, it focuses on a narrower issue relating 
specifically to the constitutionality of executing someone who has made a colorable claim of 
innocence. 
 10. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315 (1995); Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404. 
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procedural roadblocks.
11
 For example, in Schlup v. Delo,
12
 the 
defendant used his claim of actual innocence as a gateway to argue 
his ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct 
claims, not as a substantive claim in and of itself.
13
 The applicable 
standard when using innocence as a “gateway” claim was described 
by the Court in Schlup as one that “imposes a lower burden of proof 
than the ‘clear and convincing’ standard.”
14
 
The second, much more contested method for arguing a 
postconviction claim of actual innocence is using the fact of 
innocence itself as the basis of a constitutional violation. Essentially, 
in this context, the proponent argues that continued incarceration or 
execution violates the Eighth Amendment because new evidence 
proves the conviction is invalid—that is, the defendant is factually 
innocent of the crime of conviction. This type of claim is commonly 
referred to as a “freestanding” claim of innocence—in the sense that 
it is not attached to another substantive constitutional claim or 
claims.
15
 
The Supreme Court considered “freestanding” claims of 
innocence in the context of capital cases in Herrera.
16
 Although six 
justices at least hypothetically agreed
17
 that such claims could be 
presented by individuals who had been sentenced to death,
18
 there 
was widespread disagreement regarding the standard of proof that 
should apply to such claims. The majority opinion, authored by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, referred to a vague “extraordinarily high” 
 
 11. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. 
 12. 513 U.S. 298. 
 13. Id. at 306. 
 14. Id. at 327. 
 15. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404–05. 
 16. See id. at 390–98. 
 17. Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, and O’Connor "assume[d] for the sake of argument” that 
such a claim would exist (at least with respect to the execution of an innocent person), id. at 417, 
while Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter indicated that they would affirmatively recognize 
the existence of such claim, id. at 435 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices Scalia and Thomas 
indicated that freestanding claims of innocence are not constitutionally cognizable. Id. at 428 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
 18. The majority affirmatively held, quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963), 
that “absent an accompanying constitutional violation, . . . [a claim] of actual innocence was not 
cognizable because . . . ‘the existence merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt 
of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas corpus.’” Herrera, 506 U.S. at 397–
98 (citations omitted). 
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standard
19
 but avoided further definition by finding that, regardless 
of the specific test applied, Herrera did not meet it. Justice O’Connor 
wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice Kennedy joined, 
indicating that the Court need not articulate a standard of proof at 
that time, but opining, for the sake of argument, that “a truly 
persuasive demonstration of actual innocence” would render an 
execution unconstitutional.
20
 Justice White, in his concurring 
opinion, indicated that a freestanding innocence claim would, at the 
very least, require the petitioner to “show that based on proffered 
newly discovered evidence and the entire record before the jury that 
convicted him, ‘no rational trier of fact could [find] proof of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
21
 
Finally, Justice Blackmun noted in his dissenting opinion 
(joined by Justices Stevens and Souter) that the standard for a 
petitioner seeking to overturn his conviction on a claim of actual 
innocence should be that he “probably is innocent.”
22
 He compared 
this standard to the one applied to a gateway innocence claim, which 
requires a petitioner to show a “fair probability that, in light of all the 
evidence, . . . the trier of the facts would have entertained a 
reasonable doubt of his guilt,”
23
 and indicated that it is an 
appropriately higher burden for the petitioner to meet. As opposed to 
“raising doubt about his guilt” in light of the new evidence, the 
petitioner in a postconviction innocence hearing would have the 
burden of actually proving his innocence under a preponderance of 
the evidence standard.
24
 According to Justice Blackmun, this 
standard would balance the burdens appropriately in a postconviction 
setting—where the presumption of innocence no longer applies—and 
give due deference to the trial process.
25
 
 
 19. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417. 
 20. Id. at 427 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 21. Id. at 429 (White, J., concurring) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 
(1979)). 
 22. Id. at 442 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 23. Id. (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 455, n.17 (1986)). This standard was 
further clarified in Schlup, where the Court held that a petitioner asserting a gateway claim of 
actual innocence must show that “in light of new evidence . . . it is more likely than not that no 
reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup v. Delo, 
513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). 
 24. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 442–43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 25. Id. 
  
Fall 2012] INNOCENCE FOUND 7 
 
In addition to the varying degrees of suggested standards for the 
hypothetically recognized freestanding claim of actual innocence, the 
Court’s Herrera decision also generated a great deal of confusion 
regarding the appropriate remedy that would apply if a petitioner 
were able to successfully present such a claim. The issue upon which 
the Court granted certiorari was “whether the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments permit a state to execute an individual who is innocent 
of the crime for which he or she was convicted and sentenced to 
death.”
26
 This question seemingly limited any remedy to 
commutation of the death sentence imposed. Although Herrera 
himself urged that a new trial would not necessarily be required, the 
majority indicated that any habeas remedy must necessarily include 
release of the prisoner and the possibility of a new trial, stating that 
“[i]t would be a rather strange jurisprudence, in these circumstances, 
which held that under our Constitution [an innocent person] could 
not be executed, but that he could spend the rest of his life in 
prison.”
27
 Additionally, one of the reasons for the “extraordinarily 
high” standard noted by the majority was the “enormous burden that 
having to retry cases based on often stale evidence would place on 
the States.”
28
 
Furthermore, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun 
indicated that shifting the burden of proof to the petitioner and 
requiring a higher burden than that imposed for a gateway innocence 
claim were appropriate given the difficulties inherent in retrying an 
older case and the possibility that the “actual-innocence proceeding 
thus may constitute the final word on whether the defendant may be 
punished.”
29
 Based on this statement, it is clear that Justice 
Blackmun anticipated the reversal of the petitioner’s original 
conviction and a new trial as the appropriate remedy for freestanding 
innocence claims. 
 
 26. Brief for Petitioner, Herrera, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (No. 91-7328), 1992 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 422, at *5. 
 27. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 405. Ironically, the Court’s holding in Schlup—that an individual 
who can show that, “in light of the new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable 
juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” may nevertheless be 
constitutionally executed—seems an even stranger jurisprudence to postulate. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 
299. 
 28. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417. 
 29. Id. at 443. 
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Ten years later, in House v. Bell,
30
 the issue of applicable 
remedy still appeared to be unresolved.
31
 In this case, the petitioner 
presented both a gateway claim of innocence and a freestanding 
claim of innocence.
32
 A mixture of judges from the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals considered remedies ranging from sentencing 
relief, to a new trial, to outright release.
33
 Two years later, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether House had 
presented sufficient evidence of either a gateway or freestanding 
claim of innocence.
34
 This gave the Court the opportunity not only to 
specifically define the standard for a freestanding claim of actual 
innocence but also to clarify the available remedies. However, it 
chose to do neither. Instead, the Court found that House met the 
Schlup standard for gateway claims and remanded the case for 
consideration of his ineffective assistance and prosecutorial 
misconduct claims.
35
 With regard to House’s freestanding claim of 
innocence, the Court stated: 
House urges the Court to answer the question left open in 
Herrera and hold not only that freestanding innocence 
claims are possible but also that he has established one. 
We decline to resolve this issue. We conclude here, 
much as in Herrera, that whatever burden a hypothetical 
freestanding innocence claim would require, this petitioner 
has not satisfied it. . . . The sequence of the Court’s 
decisions in Herrera and Schlup—first leaving unresolved 
the status of freestanding claims and then establishing the 
gateway standard—implies at the least that Herrera 
requires more convincing proof of innocence than Schlup. It 
 
 30. 547 U.S. 518 (2006). 
 31. See generally id. (explaining that there is little resolution of what remedy should be used 
for freestanding innocence claims). 
 32. Id. at 554. 
 33. Id. at 535–36. In the initial review of House’s habeas petition, one judge indicated that 
House “present[ed] a strong claim for habeas relief, at least at the sentencing phase of the case.” 
Id. at 535 (quoting House v. Bell, 331 F.3d 767, 787 (6th Cir. 2002) (Gilman, J., dissenting)). On 
return to a fifteen judge en banc panel, six judges found that evidence of petitioner’s innocence 
was so compelling that he was entitled to “immediate release” under Justice White’s standard for 
freestanding innocence claims, and another judge found that the new evidence entitled petitioner 
to a new trial under the same standard. Id. at 535–36. 
 34. Id. at 536. 
 35. Id. at 555. 
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follows, given the closeness of the Schlup question here, 
that House’s showing falls short of the threshold implied in 
Herrera.
36
 
Although the Court refused to provide any further definition to 
the Herrera standard (or even formally recognize it), some 
clarification can be gleaned from its discussion of House’s gateway 
innocence claim. Initially, the Court affirmed the standard announced 
in Schlup for such claims: “prisoners asserting innocence as a 
gateway to defaulted claims must establish that, in light of new 
evidence, ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would 
have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
37
 After 
reviewing the new evidence presented by House, the Court found 
that “although the issue is close, . . . this is the rare case where—had 
the jury heard all the conflicting testimony—it is more likely than 
not that no reasonable juror viewing the record as a whole would 
lack reasonable doubt” as to the guilt of the defendant.
38
 
To truly understand the demanding nature of the proof required 
by the Court to satisfy this “lesser” standard, a review of the 
evidence presented by House is necessary. An en banc panel of the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals conducted an exhaustive review of 
this evidence, which was summarized in Chief Judge Merritt’s 
dissenting opinion as follows: 
Through extremely persuasive and affirmative evidence that 
Mr. Muncey killed his wife, House has shown that it is 
highly probable that he is completely innocent of any 
wrongdoing whatever. There is no reasonable basis for 
disbelieving the six witnesses who now incriminate Mr. 
Muncey as the perpetrator of the crime. The most 
compelling part of this new testimony involves his 
confession to the murder in front of two witnesses who have 
no connection to House and no bias against Mr. Muncey. 
Furthermore, before his wife’s body was even located, he 
solicited a neighbor to fabricate an alibi on his behalf. He 
was heard returning home around the time of the murder. 
 
 36. Id. at 554–55 (emphasis added). 
 37. Id. at 536–37 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). 
 38. Id. at 554. 
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And considering his history of domestic violence and his 
wife’s plans to leave him he had a motive to kill. In 
contrast, there is no evidence of a motive for House. All of 
the state’s physical evidence, both blood and semen, 
allegedly tying House to the murder, has been effectively 
rebutted. The new body of evidence as a whole so 
completely undermines the case against House and 
establishes a persuasive case against Muncey that, had it 
been presented at trial, no rational juror could have found 
evidence sufficient for conviction.
39
 
Not only did House present persuasive evidence that the 
victim’s husband was the actual killer, he rebutted, in its entirety, the 
forensic evidence that was presented and used by the prosecution at 
the trial not only as affirmative proof of House’s presence at the 
scene of the crime but also of his alleged motive for the killing.
40
 
Given this evidence, it is not surprising that seven of the fifteen 
judges sitting on the en banc panel found that this evidence met the 
“extraordinarily high” Herrera standard.
41
 However, even with the 
persuasively convincing evidence presented by House, the Supreme 
Court found that his claim just barely satisfied the less demanding 
gateway-claim standard.
42
 If the Herrera freestanding claim standard 
is, in fact, higher than the Schlup gateway standard, it is no wonder 
that the Supreme Court has yet to find a set of facts that satisfies it. 
Were it not for the fact that House had substantive constitutional 
claims to argue in addition to his innocence, he likely would have 
been executed by now.
43
 
 
 39. House v. Bell, 386 F.3d 668, 708 (6th Cir. 2004) (Merritt, J., dissenting), rev’d, 547 U.S. 
518 (2006). 
 40. House, 547 U.S. at 552–53. DNA testing revealed that the semen that was found on the 
victim’s clothing was from her husband, not House (thereby eliminating the rape motive asserted 
by the prosecution), and the blood stains found on House’s jeans, although belonging to the 
victim, were “too similar to blood collected during the autopsy . . . to have come from [the 
victim’s] body on the night of the crime.” Id. at 542. 
 41. House, 386 F.3d at 708 (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
 42. House, 547 U.S. at 554. 
 43. House v. Bell, No. 3:96-cv-883, 2007 WL 4568444, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 20, 2007). 
Upon remand, a United States district court in the Eastern District of Tennessee granted Mr. 
House’s habeas petition in part and remanded the case to the trial court to await the State’s 
decision regarding reprosecution. Id. On July 2, 2008, House was released on bail. Released from 
Death Row, but Not Exonerated, NBCNEWS.COM (July 24, 2008, 10:35 PM EST), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25836468#UDZyCmj6nFI. On May 12, 2009, the State dropped 
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Three years following its holding in House, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in a capital case involving a freestanding claim of 
innocence in the highly publicized and controversial case of Troy 
Davis.
44
 In a memorandum opinion, the Court remanded the case to 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia 
for a hearing on Davis’ innocence claim, based on the fact that 
seven of the State’s key witnesses . . . recanted their trial 
testimony; several individuals have implicated the State’s 
principal witness as the shooter; and no court, state or 
federal, has ever conducted a hearing to assess the 
reliability of the score of [postconviction] affidavits that, if 
reliable, would satisfy the threshold showing for a truly 
persuasive demonstration of actual innocence.
45
 
This memorandum opinion fell short of holding that a Herrera 
claim had been established, but it is at least an implicit recognition of 
freestanding innocence claims and gives some additional insight into 
the applicable standard for such claims. On remand, the district 
court, choosing not to “dodge the question . . . squarely before it,”
46
 
ruled on both the cognizability of a freestanding claim of innocence 
and the applicable standard. After finding that execution of an 
innocent person would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, the court went on to do what the Supreme Court 
scrupulously avoided in all prior innocence cases—it evaluated and 
ruled on the applicable standard for such claims.
47
 
Davis argued that the appropriate standard is the showing of “a 
clear probability that any reasonable juror would have reasonable 
doubt about his guilt.”
48
 He quantified a “clear probability” at “a 
sixty percent chance.”
49
 On the other hand, the State argued, based 
on Justice White’s concurrence in Herrera and Chief Justice 
 
all charges against House due to lack of evidence. David G. Savage, Murder Charges Dropped 
Because of DNA Evidence, L.A. TIMES (May 13, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2009 
/may/13/nation/na-court-dna13. 
 44. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009) (explaining that the Supreme Court granted writ of 
certiorari in this case). 
 45. Id. at 1 (internal citations omitted). 
 46. In re Davis, No. CV 409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *37 n.15 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010), 
cert. denied sub nom. Davis v. Humphrey, 131 S. Ct. 1787, 1788 (2011). 
 47. Id. at *43–45. 
 48. Id. at *44. 
 49. Id. 
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Robert’s dissent in House, that the appropriate standard is that “no 
rational trier of fact could find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”
50
 
The district court found that the Supreme Court’s innocence 
jurisprudence supported a standard that fell somewhere between the 
two proposed standards.
51
 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
relied on the Supreme Court’s description of burdens in Schlup, 
which noted that “a standard of proof represents an attempt to 
instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our 
society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual 
conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.”
52
 After a 
comparison of the different standards of proof adopted by the 
Supreme Court in postconviction claims involving an actual 
innocence component, the district court found that the appropriate 
standard was one in which the petitioner must “show by clear and 
convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted 
him in the light of the new evidence.”
53
 The district court found this 
standard to be both an appropriate balance between the Schlup “more 
likely than not” standard, which applies to gateway claims of 
innocence, and the Jackson “no rational trier of fact” standard, which 
applies to claims contesting the sufficiency of the evidence in a given 
case. It also concluded this standard was sufficient to satisfy the 
“extraordinarily high” requirement referred to in Herrera.
54
 Based on 
this standard, the district court then found that Davis had failed to 
prove his innocence and was, thus, not entitled to relief.
55
 The 
Supreme Court denied Davis’s petition for certiorari to review the 
 
 50. Id. at *44; Answer-Response and Brief in Support on Behalf of Respondent to Petition 
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 51–52, In re Davis, No. CV 409-130, 2010 WL 3385081 (S.D. 
Ga. Aug. 24, 2010). 
 51. In re Davis, at *44–45. 
 52. Id. at *44 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (quoting In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring))). 
 53. Id. at *45. 
 54. Id. (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327; Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 392 (1993); 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 308 (1979)). 
 55. Id. at *59–61. 
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district court’s conclusion.
56
 He was executed on September 21, 
2011.
57
 
As noted by Justice Blackmun in his Herrera dissent, “the 
legitimacy of punishment is inextricably intertwined with guilt.”
58
 
This pronouncement is especially true within the context of capital 
punishment. As discussed in the following section, the Supreme 
Court’s capital jurisprudence is based, in large part, on retributive 
principles that require actual guilt
59
 as a legitimating principle, 
thereby necessitating an effective mechanism for considering 
postconviction claims of innocence. 
II.  RETRIBUTIVE THEMES IN THE 
SUPREME COURT’S CAPITAL JURISPRUDENCE 
Over the last ten years, the Supreme Court has developed a firm 
line of Eighth Amendment capital jurisprudence, categorically 
invalidating the application of the death penalty in many instances.
60
 
In all of these cases, the Court applied its traditional two-part 
analysis consisting of an examination of national consensus and an 
application of its own independent judgment as the final arbiter of all 
things constitutional.
61
 In its most recent decisions, the Court has 
placed a greater emphasis on the independent-judgment facet of the 
Eighth Amendment analysis.
62
 Within this part of the analysis, the 
Court determines whether the application of the death penalty 
furthers any legitimate penological purpose.
63
 According to the 
 
 56. Davis v. Humphrey, 131 S. Ct. 1787, 1788 (2011). 
 57. Colleen Curry & Michael S. James, Troy Davis Executed After Stay Denied by Supreme 
Court, ABC NEWS (Sept. 21, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/troy-davis-executed-stay-denied 
-supreme-court/story?id=14571862#.UFym1ULIHpg. 
 58. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 433–34 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(acknowledging that six judges called for House’s immediate release, while a seventh judge 
indicated that a new trial was necessitated under the circumstances). 
 59. “Actual” guilt should be distinguished from the notion of “legal” guilt discussed in 
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Herrera, which occurs when an individual is convicted 
in a trial that is free of constitutional error. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 419–20 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 60. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2658 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
578 (2005); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986). 
 61. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 2641; Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Ford, 477 U.S. 399. 
 62. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2658; Roper, 543 U.S. at 574–75. 
 63. Roper, 543 U.S. at 553. This focus is a departure from the Court’s discussion of 
penological justifications as something separate from the overall proportionality analysis in the 
cases immediately following the invalidation of death penalty statutes nationwide in Furman v. 
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Court, the only two legitimate social purposes that can be served by 
the death penalty are deterrence and retribution.
64
 Moreover, in its 
most recent decisions, the Court has focused mainly on retribution as 
the supporting rationale for the most severe punishment available.
65
 
A.  Retributive Theory Models 
Retributive theory is based on two main premises: (1) that 
individuals act based on free will;
66
 and (2) that it is appropriate to 
inflict proportional punishment on individuals who commit criminal 
wrongs.
67
 Unlike the utilitarian theory, which looks to the future and 
generally requires some connection between punishment and the 
good of society as a whole, retribution focuses solely on the crime 
committed by the offender and the proportionality of the punishment 
at issue. 
Although the retributive theory operates on the basic premise of 
“just deserts,” several different variations have developed over the 
years. Initially, retribution can be divided into two main components: 
negative retributivism and positive retributivism.
68
 Negative 
retributivism focuses solely on the immorality of punishing an 
innocent person—positing that “the retributive principle of just 
deserts is a necessary condition of punishment.”
69
 This form of 
retributivism is widely accepted as a legitimate limitation on 
utilitarian theory, which does not automatically condemn the 
 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 332–33 (1972) (explaining that punishments that are excessive violate the 
constitution). See generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976) (explaining the 
importance in analyzing the proportionality of a punishment). 
 64. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183. 
 65. See generally Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2661–62 (explaining that retribution is the 
primary rationale for using the death penalty); Roper, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (explaining that 
retribution is a primary rationale for using the death penalty); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
319 (2002) (explaining that retribution is a primary rationale for using the death penalty). 
 66. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 173 (1987) (explaining that the retributive rationale 
for capital punishment is inappropriate where the defendant did not have the intent to commit the 
crime). 
 67. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010) (citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 
149 (1987)) (explaining that “[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence 
must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender”). 
 68. Joshua Dressler, Hating Criminals: How Can Something That Feels So Good Be 
Wrong?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448, 1451 (1990) (citing J.L. Mackie, Morality and the Retributive 
Emotions, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1982, at 3, 4). 
 69. Id. at 1451. 
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punishment of an innocent person if the benefit to society as a whole 
outweighs the burden imposed on the innocent person. 
Positive retributivism, on the other hand, is a much broader 
concept that not only decries the punishment of an innocent person, 
but also affirmatively requires punishment of the guilty—holding 
that “retributive justice is a necessary and sufficient condition of 
punishment.”
70
 This form of retributive theory is more controversial 
than negative retributivism, but it is commonly accepted as one of 
many legitimate penological goals.
71
 Positive retributivism, however, 
has several subsets, which can be classified into two main categories: 
“assaultive” and “protective.”
72
 
While there are variations within each category of positive 
retributivism, assaultive retribution can generally be described as a 
vindictive, vengeance-based theory that “regard[s] criminals as rather 
like noxious insects to be ground under the heel of society.”
73
 At the 
other end of the positive retributivist spectrum is the protective 
variation, which views punishment as a means of securing moral 
balance in society—“that not only does a just society have a right to 
punish voluntary wrongdoers, but that criminals also have a right to 
be punished.”
74
 
One version of the protective variation of retributive theory has 
been described by Professor Joshua Dressler as follows: 
As Professor Herbert Morris has explained, society is 
composed of rules that forbid various form[s] of harmful 
conduct; compliance with these rules burdens each member 
of the community that exercises self-restraint. These same 
rules provide a benefit in the form of “noninterference by 
others with what each person values, such . . . as 
continuance of life and bodily security.” As long as 
everyone follows the rules, an equilibrium exists—everyone 
is similarly benefitted and burdened. If a person fails to 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. See generally Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010) (explaining that retribution is one 
“legitimate reason to punish”). 
 72. Margaret J. Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for 
Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1168–69 (1980). 
 73. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 3 (1988) (citing 2 
JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81–82 (1883)). 
 74. Dressler, supra note 68, at 1452. 
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exercise self-restraint when he could have—when he 
renounces a burden that others have assumed—he destroys 
the balance. He becomes a free rider: He has the benefits of 
the system of rules, without accepting the same burdens. 
Thus, a criminal owes a debt to society. It is fair, therefore, 
to require payment of the debt, i.e., punishment equal or 
proportional to the debt owed (i.e. the crime committed).
75
 
Another variation of protective retributivism views the 
punishment as a means of restoring the victim’s worth as a human 
being.
76
 As noted by Professor Jean Hampton: 
[Criminal] conduct causes a moral injury, which means that 
it expresses and does damage to the acknowledgement and 
realization of the value of the victim. . . . [R]etribution is a 
response to a wrong that is intended to vindicate the value 
of the victim denied by the wrongdoer’s action through the 
construction of an event that not only repudiates the 
action’s message of superiority over the victim but does so 
in a way that confirms them as equal by virtue of their 
humanity.
77
 
Essentially, this theory legitimizes punishment as a method for 
restoring a victim’s societal and personal worth—focusing more on 
bringing the victim back up to his or her rightful place in society than 
on bringing the wrongdoer back down to his or her rightful place. 
The Supreme Court has never specifically identified the form of 
retribution it considers appropriate under the Eighth Amendment. In 
fact, its capital jurisprudence includes references to both positive and 
negative retributive theory and to multiple variations within the 
positive retribution category. For example, in Gregg v. Georgia,
78
 
one of the Court’s first cases following its categorical rejection of 
death penalty statutes nationwide in Furman v. Georgia,
79
 the Court 
described retribution as “an expression of the community’s belief 
that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity 
 
 75. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW: THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 17–
18 (5th ed. 2009) (citing Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 Monist 475, 477 (1968)). 
 76. Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 
UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1686 (1992). 
 77. Id. at 1685–86. 
 78. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 79. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.”
80
 The 
Court explained that retribution is accepted as a legitimate basis for 
the imposition of a death sentence because 
[t]he instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and 
channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal 
justice serves an important purpose in promoting the 
stability of a society governed by law. When people begin 
to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to 
impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they 
‘deserve,’ then there are sown the seeds of anarchy—of 
self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.
81
 
These early statements seem to lean heavily toward assaultive forms 
of retribution—focusing on punishment for the sake of punishment. 
However, in the Court’s more recent capital jurisprudence, it 
refers to retribution in terms of both assaultive and protective 
theories. For example, in Roper v. Simmons,
82
 Justice Kennedy 
seemingly embraced both theories with the following statement 
rejecting the application of the death penalty to juveniles: “Whether 
viewed as an attempt to express the community’s moral outrage or as 
an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the victim, the case 
for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult.”
83
 
Additionally, in its most recent capital decision, Kennedy v. 
Louisiana,
84
 Justice Kennedy described retribution as both a 
reflection of “society’s and the victim’s interests in seeing that the 
offender is repaid for the hurt he caused”
85
 and a mechanism for 
“balanc[ing] the wrong to the victim.”
86
 The former statement 
 
 80. 428 U.S. at 184; see also id. at 184 n.30 (“Punishment is the way in which society 
expresses its denunciation of wrong doing: and, in order to maintain respect for law, it is essential 
that the punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the 
great majority of citizens for them. It is a mistake to consider the objects of punishment as being 
deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else . . . . The truth is that some crimes are so 
outrageous that society insists on adequate punishment, because the wrong-doer deserves it, 
irrespective of whether it is a deterrent or not.” (quoting ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE 207 (1950))). 
 81. Id. at 183 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., 
concurring)). 
 82. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 83. Id. at 571. 
 84. 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). 
 85. Id. at 2662. 
 86. Id. 
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focuses on the more vindictive form of assaultive retribution, and the 
latter refers to the moral balancing that is the basis of protective 
retribution. In Graham v. Florida,
87
 Justice Kennedy, addressing the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause generally, further noted “the 
essential principle that, under the Eighth Amendment, the State must 
respect the human attributes even of those who have committed 
serious crimes.”
88
 
Therefore, it appears that the Court applies a mixture of 
retributive theories within its Eighth Amendment analysis. However, 
regardless of the differences between the various theories of 
retribution, each accepts and demands one basic premise—only the 
guilty can be punished. This concept is especially true within the 
context of the death penalty. Unlike utilitarian theories, which might 
allow for the punishment of an innocent person (if it served the 
“greater good”),
89
 retributive theory is only legitimately served if 
punishment fitting the crime is imposed on a factually guilty person. 
This realization is incorporated in all of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions discussing retribution as a legitimizing theory for the 
imposition of a particular punishment. Most notably, in capital cases, 
the Court has found an insufficient nexus between retributive theory 
and the death penalty when categories of individuals and victims 
make the risk of wrongful conviction a possibility.
90
 
B.  Retributive Theory, 
Wrongful Conviction, 
and the Death Penalty 
As noted above, when evaluating a categorical challenge to the 
imposition of a particular sentence, the Court first determines 
whether there is a national consensus for or against the punishment 
in the context at issue. Regardless of the results of this initial 
determination, the Court then independently determines whether 
imposing the particular punishment would violate the Eighth 
 
 87. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 88. Id. at 2021. 
 89. See Dressler, supra note 68, at 1452. 
 90. E.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002). 
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Amendment.
91
 In this part of the analysis, the Court “considers 
whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate 
penological goals,”
92
 which include, in the context of the death 
penalty, retribution and deterrence.
93
 
Although both retribution and deterrence are recognized as goals 
that may legitimately be furthered by the imposition of capital 
punishment, the Court has never assigned deterrence a significant 
role in the analysis. In fact, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Court noted, 
“Statistical attempts to evaluate the worth of the death penalty as a 
deterrent to crimes by potential offenders have occasioned a great 
deal of debate. The results simply have been inconclusive.”
94
 The 
Court went on to assume that the death penalty may have some 
deterrent value, leaving it to the states to determine the particular 
effect within each jurisdiction.
95
 However, the Court placed a greater 
emphasis on retributive theory as a legitimate penological 
justification for the imposition of such a sentence.
96
 In more recent 
years, the issue of the death penalty’s deterrent effect has drawn 
much more heated criticism.
97
 In fact, some justices have rejected the 
viability of deterrence as a legitimating factor for the death penalty 
altogether.
98
 
 
 91. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (“Community consensus, while ‘entitled to great weight,’ is 
not itself determinative of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.” (quoting Kennedy, 128 S. 
Ct. at 2658)). 
 92. Id.; see also Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2661 (examining whether a capital sentence for the 
crime of child rape satisfied the “distinct social purposes served by the death penalty”); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571–75 (2005) (considering whether a capital sentence imposed on a 
juvenile would further any legitimate penological goals); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318–20 (explaining 
why the accepted justifications for the death penalty could not support the execution of an 
intellectually disabled individual). 
 93. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976). 
 94. Id. at 184–85. 
 95. Id. at 185–86. 
 96. Id. (explaining that retribution was a proper consideration to weigh in determining 
whether the death penalty should be imposed). 
 97. See generally Michael L. Radelet & Traci L. Lacock, Do Executions Lower Homicide 
Rates?: The Views of Leading Criminologists, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489 (2009) 
(arguing that the death penalty is not a deterrent); Michael L. Radelet & Ronald L. Akers, 
Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The Views of the Experts, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 
(1996) (arguing that the death penalty is not a deterrent). 
 98. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614 (2002) (“[R]etribution provides the main 
justification for capital punishment”) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Spanziano v. Florida, 468 
U.S. 447, 477–81 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
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Given the importance of the Court’s independent analysis in 
death penalty challenges and the overriding focus on retribution as 
the most viable penological theory justifying capital punishment, the 
Court’s application of this theory should be accorded great weight 
within an Eighth Amendment analysis. Determining the role of 
retribution in an Eighth Amendment analysis is best accomplished by 
examining the Supreme Court’s capital jurisprudence. 
In Atkins v. Virginia,
99
 the Supreme Court addressed the 
constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on an “intellectually 
disabled” individual.
100
 In assessing whether the execution of such an 
individual meaningfully contributes to retribution, the Court 
considered the increased possibility of false confessions and 
wrongful executions that such individuals faced.
101
 The Court noted 
its concern that the possibility of inappropriately imposed death 
sentences “is enhanced . . . by the possibility of false confessions” 
and the fact that intellectually disabled defendants “may be less able 
to give meaningful assistance to their counsel.”
102
 Ultimately, these 
factors—along with the general evidentiary difficulties
103
 
encountered by such intellectually disabled individuals—led the 
Court to find that they “face a special risk of wrongful execution.”
104
 
Although the Court’s retribution analysis also focused on the lesser 
culpability of this group of individuals, its recognition of the risk of 
wrongful conviction and wrongful execution
105
 is compelling. In 
 
 99. 536 U.S. 304, (2002). 
 100. Id. at 307 (explaining that the issue in the case is whether executions of “intellectually 
disabled” individuals are “‘cruel and unusual punishments’ prohibited by the Eighth Amendment 
to the Federal Constitution”). The American Association on Intellectual and Developmental 
Disabilities (formerly known as the American Association on Mental Retardation or AAMR) 
suggests that the term “intellectual disability” is more appropriate than the traditional reference to 
“mental retardation.” Robert L. Schalock et al., The Renaming of Mental Retardation: 
Understanding the Change to the Term Intellectual Disability, 45 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL 
DISABILITIES J. 116, 118 (2007). 
 101. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320–21 (2002). 
 102. Id. 
 103. The Court found that intellectually disabled defendants had a “lesser ability” to “make a 
persuasive showing of mitigation in the face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more aggravating 
factors.” Id. at 320. The Court also noted that such individuals are “typically poor witnesses, and 
their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes.” Id. at 
320–21. 
 104. Id. at 321. 
 105. “Wrongful execution” refers to insufficient evidence to support a death sentence, as 
opposed to insufficient evidence to support the underlying conviction. Id. at 305, 319. 
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fact, the Court specifically voiced its concern regarding wrongful 
convictions in the context of the death penalty as follows: 
Despite the heavy burden that the prosecution must 
shoulder in capital cases, we cannot ignore the fact that in 
recent years a disturbing number of inmates on death row 
have been exonerated. These exonerations have included at 
least one [intellectually disabled] person who unwittingly 
confessed to a crime that he did not commit.
106
 
The mere possibility of either a wrongful conviction or death 
sentence was enough, in combination with the other factors 
considered, to lead the Court to conclude that intellectually disabled 
individuals should be categorically excluded from application of the 
death penalty.
107
 
This trend continued in Kennedy v. Louisiana, in which the 
Court addressed whether the Eighth Amendment categorically 
excludes the death penalty in child rape cases.
108
 In its discussion of 
retribution, the Court noted: 
There are . . . serious systemic concerns in prosecuting 
the crime of child rape that are relevant to the 
constitutionality of making it a capital offense. The problem 
of unreliable, induced, and even imagined child testimony 
means there is a “special risk of wrongful execution” in 
some child rape cases. This undermines, at least to some 
degree, the meaningful contribution of the death penalty to 
legitimate goals of punishment. 
. . . Although capital punishment does bring retribution, and 
the legislature here has chosen to use it for this end, its 
judgment must be weighed, in deciding the constitutional 
question, against the special risks of unreliable testimony 
with respect to this crime.
109
 
 
 106. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320, n.25. 
 107. Such factors include the lesser culpability of an intellectually disabled individual who, 
by definition, has a diminished capacity "to understand and process information, to communicate, 
to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control 
impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.” Id. at 318. 
 108. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (discussing whether a categorical rule 
exempting child rape from the death penalty was appropriate). 
 109. Id. at 2663 (citation omitted). 
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Similar to its holding in Atkins, the Court again instituted a 
categorical ban on the imposition of the death penalty based—in 
significant part—on the mere possibility of a wrongful conviction.
110
 
Instead of coming from characteristics specific to the defendant, this 
time the threat of wrongful conviction was generated by the status of 
the victim.
111
 In both instances, the Court found that the possibility 
of wrongful conviction eliminated any meaningful contribution the 
death penalty might have had to retributive theory.
112
 
Even outside the context of the death penalty, the Court has 
viewed the possibility of inaccurate sentencing decisions and 
wrongful convictions as significant factors in its Eighth Amendment 
analysis. In Graham v. Florida, the Court discussed the issues that 
arise with juvenile defendants: 
[T]he features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put 
them at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings. 
Juveniles mistrust adults and have limited understandings of 
the criminal justice system and the roles of the institutional 
actors within it. They are less likely than adults to work 
effectively with their lawyers to aid in their defense . . . 
[which is] likely to impair the quality of a juvenile 
defendant’s representation. . . . A categorical rule [against 
the imposition of a life without parole sentence] avoids the 
risk that, as a result of these difficulties, a court or jury will 
erroneously conclude that a particular juvenile is 
sufficiently culpable to deserve [such sentence] for a 
nonhomicide [crime].
113
 
Whether relating to the inability of an accused to work with 
counsel effectively, or to reliability issues inherent with certain 
categories of witnesses, the Supreme Court has consistently found 
that the risks of wrongful conviction and punishment are not only 
relevant to the Eighth Amendment analysis but also militate in favor 
of constitutional restrictions on sentencing.
114
 
 
 110. Id. at 2645. 
 111. Id. at 2641. 
 112. Id. at 444; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
 113. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010) (citations omitted). 
 114. Id. (holding that life without parole cannot be imposed on a juvenile for a non-homicide 
offense); see also Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 413 (explaining that there should be a constitutional 
restriction on the death penalty for individuals who raped children); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 
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In response to the Supreme Court’s confusing jurisprudence on 
the viability of freestanding claims of innocence, at least one lower 
court has considered the issue of retribution specifically as it relates 
to a postconviction claim of innocence in a capital case. In In re 
Davis,
115
 a federal district court in the Southern District of Georgia 
recognized the viability of a freestanding claim of innocence based, 
in part, on the fact that “[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that 
a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal 
culpability of the criminal offender.”
116
 The court went on to 
compare the theory of retribution to the idea of revenge: 
While retribution and revenge overlap, they are not the 
same. Retribution aims to restore a harmonious balance to 
society; revenge sates individual desires. Retribution 
restores balance by providing a wrongdoer with his just 
deserts. However, balance is restored only with accuracy; a 
mislaid blow, no matter how swift, only increases the moral 
imbalance by imposing additional unjustified suffering. 
Revenge, meanwhile, requires only that another suffer as 
much as the victim. It desires swiftness, but requires 
minimal accuracy. Revenge may be derived from either the 
deserving party or a simple scapegoat. When retribution is 
taken against the correct party, both revenge and retribution 
may be had, but neither should be mistaken for the other.
117
 
Ultimately, the court found, under a traditional Eighth Amendment 
categorical analysis, that the execution of an individual who could 
make a postconviction showing of innocence constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment.
118
 
Taken as a whole, this body of jurisprudence illustrates the 
overriding importance of retributive theory in the context of death 
penalty cases and the intimate connection between and among 
 
(explaining that the death penalty as applied to mentally incompetent individuals is 
unconstitutional and should be categorically restricted). 
 115. No. CV 409-130, 2010 WL 3385081 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010), cert. denied sub nom. 
Davis v. Humphrey, 131 S. Ct. 1787, 1788 (2011). 
 116. Id. at *43 (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)). 
 117. Id. at *43, n.35 (citation omitted) (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 
(2010); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)). 
 118. Id. at *43. The court ultimately concluded that Davis was not entitled to relief because he 
was unable to make a sufficient showing of actual innocence. Id. at *61. 
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retribution, actual guilt, and execution. With these concepts in mind, 
the following section discusses how freestanding innocence claims 
should be addressed in the context of capital cases. 
III.  ADDRESSING INNOCENCE IN THE 
CONTEXT OF PENDING EXECUTIONS 
The Supreme Court’s reliance on retributive theory as a 
significant legitimating factor for the imposition of a death penalty 
and retribution’s determinative requirement of actual guilt
119
 both 
support a tiered approach to the consideration of freestanding actual-
innocence claims in capital cases. Under this tiered system of review, 
different standards should apply depending on the remedy at issue, 
with a lower standard applying to commutation of sentence, as 
opposed to reversal of conviction and the possibility of a new trial. 
As discussed below, this tiered approach is supported by the 
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment retribution-based 
jurisprudence, and it effectively balances society’s interest in 
avoiding the execution of an innocent person against the burden 
inherent in retrying potentially stale cases. The approach that best 
implements Eighth Amendment principles is one that allows 
freestanding claims of innocence in capital cases and requires (1) 
commutation of a death sentence if the petitioner can show that in 
light of new evidence, “it is more likely than not that no reasonable 
juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt,”
120
 and (2) a new trial where petitioner can prove his 
innocence under a higher standard, such as the clear and convincing 
evidence standard adopted by the district court in In re Davis.
121
 
It should initially be noted that it is not unusual for the Court to 
consider postconviction impediments to execution. In Ford v. 
Wainwright,
122
 the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
the execution of a mentally incompetent person and that a convicted 
defendant is entitled to a hearing prior to execution if competency is 
 
 119. This is true regardless of the particular theory of retribution at issue. See supra Part I. 
 120. This is the same standard the Court applies to gateway innocence claims, as announced 
in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). 
 121. See supra Part II. 
 122. 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
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an issue.
123
 As noted by Justice Blackmun in his dissenting opinion 
in Herrera, the Court’s decision in Ford recognizes that “capital 
defendants may be entitled to further proceedings because of an 
intervening development even though they have been validly 
convicted and sentenced to death.”
124
 The Herrera majority 
discounted any reliance on Ford as supporting the viability of 
freestanding innocence claims, but it did so based on the misguided 
notion that “Ford’s claim went to a matter of punishment—not 
guilt,” and was therefore “properly examined within the purview of 
the Eighth Amendment.”
125
 This argument, however, does not give 
proper consideration to the definitive connection between retributive 
theory and actual guilt. As noted by Justice Blackmun, “the 
legitimacy of punishment is inextricably intertwined with guilt.”
126
 
This concept is especially true in the context of capital cases, where 
the legality of the punishment is so closely tied to retributive theory 
and its accompanying requirement of actual guilt. 
The Court’s decision in Ford bears this out, as it relies in large 
part on the lack of retributive effect in finding that the execution of 
an insane person violates the Eighth Amendment.
127
 As noted by 
Justice Marshall in the majority opinion, “We may seriously question 
the retributive value of executing a person who has no 
comprehension of why he has been singled out and stripped of his 
fundamental right to life.”
128
 
The differences of opinion among Supreme Court justices and 
lower courts regarding the applicable standard for a freestanding 
claim of innocence seems to derive primarily from confusion or 
disagreement over the appropriate remedy for such a claim. The 
Court’s concern regarding burdens associated with the relitigation of 
guilt and innocence issues supports a higher standard for 
freestanding claims of innocence where the requested remedy is 
 
 123. Id. at 410. 
 124. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 433 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 125. Id. at 406. 
 126. Id. at 433–34. 
 127. The Court noted that “[m]ore recent commentators opine that the community's quest for 
‘retribution’—the need to offset a criminal act by a punishment of equivalent ‘moral quality’—is 
not served by execution of an insane person, which has a ‘lesser value’ than that of the crime for 
which he is to be punished.” Ford, 477 U.S. at 408 (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard & W. David 
Louisell, Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. REV. 381, 387 (1962)). 
 128. Id. at 409. 
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retrial. However, there is no reason why retrial—and its associated 
“extraordinarily high” standard—must stand as the only option 
available to the petitioner who can show that “it is more likely than 
not” that he is innocent. Under such circumstances, it is more 
appropriate to apply the remedy of commutation of sentence, as 
opposed to foreclosing the petitioner from any relief at all and 
proceeding with the execution of a person who is probably innocent. 
Neither of the concerns noted by the Supreme Court in 
Herrera—retrial burden
129
 and finality
130
—is triggered by the 
commutation of a death sentence under a freestanding innocence 
claim. Certainly, the Eighth Amendment requires more than turning 
a blind eye
131
 to the probable execution of an innocent person under 
the guise of “finality.” In the context of the death penalty, the finality 
upon which the Eighth Amendment focuses concerns the punishment 
at issue, not the criminal process.
132
 If it is more likely than not that 
we are about to execute an innocent person, such punishment truly 
does come “perilously close to simple murder.”
133
 
A lower standard for commutation of a death sentence is also 
supported by the Eighth Amendment and its reliance on retributive 
theory, which requires more than the fiction of guilt derived from an 
otherwise constitutionally sound conviction. Retribution demands 
actual guilt as a legitimating premise for punishment—especially in 
the context of the death penalty. As the Innocence Project has proven 
time and time again,
134
 mistakes are made across the nation in the 
 
 129. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 392. 
 130. Id. at 426. 
 131. “This is not to say that our habeas jurisprudence casts a blind eye toward innocence.” Id. 
at 404 (indicating that gateway claims are sufficient constitutional consideration of innocence). 
 132. The Supreme Court has noted on many occasions, most recently in Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, that “death is different” as a class of punishment due to its severity and ultimate 
finality. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2654 (2008) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 187 (1976)). 
 133. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 446 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 134. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 
149–78 (2003) (discussing the exoneration of 98 death row prisoners between 1973 and 2001); 
Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987); Innocence Project Case Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2012) (indicating 289 post-
conviction DNA exonerations in the history of the United States, 17 of which were individuals on 
death row); O’Connor Questions Death Penalty, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-280_162-299592.html. 
  
Fall 2012] INNOCENCE FOUND 27 
 
criminal justice system
135
—even when constitutional requirements 
are followed. To ignore these mistakes is to ignore the legitimating 
premise of the death penalty itself. 
The appropriate standard for commutation of a death sentence is 
the less demanding “more likely than not” standard applied to 
gateway innocence claims. In Schlup v. Delo the Court noted: 
[A] standard of proof represents an attempt to instruct the 
factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society 
thinks he should have in the correctness of factual 
conclusions for a particular type of adjudication. . . . [The 
standard of proof thus reflects] the relative importance 
attached to the ultimate decision.
136
 
In Schlup, the Court explained that the primary difference 
between a gateway claim of innocence and a freestanding claim of 
innocence (and their correspondingly different standards) hinged on 
the validity accorded to the original trials in each case.
137
 Because 
gateway claims are accompanied by an assertion of constitutional 
error at the trial level, the petitioner’s conviction is not “entitled to 
the same degree of respect”
138
 as one “that is the product of an error 
free trial,”
139
 as would be the case with freestanding claims. 
Although this distinction may be relevant when the remedy requested 
is a new trial, it is not applicable when the only issue under 
consideration is the execution of an innocent person. When 
 
 135. As noted by Chief Judge Merritt in his dissenting opinion in House v. Bell, 386 F.3d 688, 
709 (2004) (Meritt, C.J., dissenting): 
High on the list of the causes for mistakes are the kinds of errors we see in this case: 
the misinterpretation or abuse of scientific evidence, the adverse inferences drawn from 
the prior record of a defendant, particularly one who is a stranger in the local 
community, the failure of counsel to uncover (until it is too late) witnesses who could 
exonerate the defendant, and the existence of one or more other suspects with a motive 
to commit the offense. Once the initial trial and appeal have occurred, it is clear from 
the studies that the state, and its officials who have prosecuted, sentenced and reviewed 
the case, are inclined to persevere in the belief that the state was right all along. They 
tend to close ranks and resist admission of error. Intelligent citizens who strongly 
believe in the reliability of the capital sanction are also inclined to persevere in the 
belief that a case raising the ‘embarrassing question’ will never really arise and close 
ranks with the state in resisting the admission of error. This case is a good example of 
how these errors can lead to the execution of a defendant who is actually innocent. 
 136. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970)). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 316. 
 139. Id. 
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commutation of a death sentence is the applicable remedy, the Eighth 
Amendment, with its retribution-based analysis, requires greater 
reliability. Therefore, the underlying conviction should not be 
accorded the same weight as it would carry otherwise, and the 
standard applied to the petitioner can be appropriately lowered. 
In the context of postconviction claims of innocence in capital 
cases, the primary concerns to be weighed include the petitioner’s 
interest in avoiding the injustice of a wrongful execution and the 
systemic interests in finality, comity, and conservation of judicial 
resources.
140
 The relative value assigned to each of these concerns 
changes dramatically based on the particular remedy at issue. The 
State’s interest in finality, as associated with the burden of retrying 
cases, is virtually nonexistent when the only issue under 
consideration is commutation of sentence. Any interest in finality 
that the State might have in this context pales in comparison to the 
individual’s interest in avoiding a wrongful execution based on a 
claim of innocence. Conversely, if the remedy at issue is a new trial, 
the relative value of the State’s concern increases and supports the 
application of a greater burden on the petitioner. 
The Court’s holding in Ford v. Wainwright also supports the 
application of a lesser standard for claims relating solely to the 
constitutionality of an execution.
141
 Although the Court left it to the 
States to develop specific standards for a pre-execution competency 
determination, including the burden of proof that must be met by an 
individual claiming incompetency, its preferred standard is a 
preponderance of the evidence.
142
 Although this analysis does not 
require reconsideration of an issue previously litigated at trial, the 
lower standard reflects the balancing of interests inherent when 
considering an impending execution. 
In summary, the tiered system of review proposed in this Article 
would permit an individual submitting a freestanding claim of actual 
innocence to argue for a new trial under the enhanced standard of 
 
 140. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986). 
 141. Id. at 427 (explaining “a constitutionally acceptable procedure may be far less formal 
than a trial”). 
 142. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-5.7(c)–(f) cmt. at 295–
301 (1989); Richard J. Bonnie, The Death Penalty and Mental Illness: Mentally Ill Prisoners on 
Death Row: Unsolved Puzzles for Courts and Legislatures, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1173–74 
(2005). 
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review implied by the Court in Herrera
143
 or, if he is unable to meet 
that standard, to seek commutation of his death sentence under the 
lesser “more likely than not” standard applied to gateway innocence 
claims. This system would accord appropriate deference to the 
systemic interests in finality and preservation of prosecutorial and 
judicial resources, confer appropriate weight to the substantial liberty 
interests of the petitioner subject to execution, and give valid effect 
to the requirements of the Eighth Amendment as it applies to capital 
cases. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has gone so far as to exclude entire groups 
of individuals
144
 and crimes
145
 from application of the death penalty 
based on the mere speculative possibility that an innocent person 
might be convicted and sentenced to death. Certainly, this Eighth 
Amendment retribution-based concern also extends to a situation in 
which an individual who has been convicted and sentenced to death 
can make a colorable postconviction claim of innocence by showing 
that, based on new evidence, “it is more likely than not that no 
reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”
146
 A tiered system of standards and remedies for 
freestanding innocence claims best balances the concerns of all: the 
petitioner, the State, and the Eighth Amendment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 143. The “clear and convincing” standard enunciated by the district court in In Re Davis is an 
appropriately enhanced standard for a freestanding claim seeking a new trial. See supra Part I. 
 144. See generally Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (excluding juveniles from 
application of a life without parole sentence for a non-homicide offense); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304 (2002) (excluding intellectually disabled individuals from the death penalty). Although 
it was not specifically discussed within Roper v. Simmons, 504 U.S. 551 (2005), certainly the 
same concern would weigh heavily against the imposition of a death sentence on a juvenile 
defendant. 
 145. See generally Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (excluding the crime of 
child rape from application of the death penalty). 
 146. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). 
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